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In Boy Scouts of America v Dale,' the Supreme Court held that
the Boy Scouts of America, in contravention of a New Jersey antidis-
crimination law, could discriminate against a gay adult leader under
its First Amendment right of expressive association.2 The Court
concluded that the New Jersey law materially infringed the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association by requiring
it to admit and retain members who did not conform to its stated
standards.
Prior to Dale, few constitutional impediments inhibited state leg-
islatures from enacting content-neutral laws prohibiting discrimina-
tory practices or policies The only organizations exempt from such
statutory mandates were organizations whose political nature re-
quired exclusionary policies' and groups whose existence or goals
would be eviscerated by application of certain laws. Yet despite the
fact that the Boy Scouts is not a political association, and including
Dale would arguably not have undermined the existence of the or-
ganization or its purposes, the Court ruled in its favor. Consequently,
t B.A. 2000, Grinnell College; J.D. 2004, The University of Chicago.
1 530 US 640 (2000).
2 Id at 644.
3 See Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 US 557,
572 (1995) ("Provisions like these are well within the State's usual power to enact when a legisla-
ture has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a
general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments."); New York State Club Association
v City of New York, 487 US 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary International v Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 US 537 (1987).
4 See California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567 (2000) (holding that the Democ-
ratic Party could withhold the right to vote in a Democratic primary from individuals registered
to other parties, in order to protect the party's First Amendment right of freedom of association).
5 See NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958) (holding that Alabama could not require the
NAACP to release membership records, which included names and addresses of all members
and agents, because this placed a substantial burden on the NAACP's freedom of association).
6 See Hurley, 515 US at 559 (holding that the application of a public accommodation law
to the plaintiff which essentially required the organization to alter the expressive content of its
parade, violated the First Amendment).
7 See Dale v Boy Scouts of America, 160 NJ 562, 734 A2d 1196, 1223 (1999) ("Boy Scout
members do not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is im-
moral."), revd, 530 US 640.
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after Dale, states likely now face First Amendment restrictions in ap-
plying antidiscrimination statutes to private organizations engaging in
particular expressive activity.8 In light of this development, this Com-
ment addresses whether the application of a statutory or regulatory
restriction on a private university's decision to use affirmative action
in selecting its students violates a university's First Amendment right
of expressive association as defined by the Supreme Court in Dale.
This Comment argues that, if the reasoning of Dale is taken seri-
ously, its principled protection of an organization's freedom of expres-
sive association grants private educational entities the right to employ
discriminatory affirmative action policies. Part I provides a brief over-
view of relevant First Amendment case law. In particular, it addresses
a state's ability to implement generally applicable laws against expres-
sive associations such as the Boy Scouts. Part II examines Dale, at-
tempting to clarify both the principles upon which it relies and the in-
tended breadth of its application. Additionally, Part II analyzes other
cases that arguably limit the scope of Dale. Part III discusses the ex-
tent to which the principles in Dale apply to private universities, par-
ticularly those seeking to implement affirmative action policies.
I. CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In Dale, the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts, despite its
ostensible violation of a content-neutral antidiscrimination law, could
expel a long-time Scout and Scout leader because of his sexual orien-
tation. The Court's holding discussed both the concept of content
neutrality and the contours of the right of expressive association. Thus,
before turning to the specifics of Dale, it is important to examine these
ideas.
A. Generally Applicable Content-Neutral Regulations
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."9 Although the text of the First Amendment
seems to forbid any congressional restriction on speech,0 the "prohibi-
8 See Dale, 530 US at 648 ("The First Amendment's protection of expressive association is
not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some
form of expression, whether it be public or private.").
9 US Const Amend I.
10 When the Bill of Rights was ratified, the First Amendment did not apply to the states.
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit state governments from passing any law that interferes with their citi-
zens' fundamental rights. In Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925), the Court concluded
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tion on encroachment of First Amendment protections is not an abso-
lute. Restraints are permitted for appropriate reasons."" One such
permissible restraint is a regulation that is content neutral (that is, a
law that limits expression but not on the basis of its content) and only
incidentally affects expressive activity. A clear example of a content-
neutral regulation, which only incidentally affects speech, is a law pro-
hibiting assault. Though assaults and other acts of violence carry with
them expressions of disdain for their victims, laws punishing such con-
duct do not raise First Amendment issues because they only minimally
affect speech.'2 In contrast, a state law that prohibited certain com-
mercial advertising or certain types of pornographic material would
not be content neutral because it would be aimed directly at suppress-
ing a certain type of speech." Furthermore, many generally applicable
content-neutral laws place nonminimal burdens on expressive activity.
In certain circumstances, a generally applicable law so unduly burdens
an association's ability to continue its expressive behavior that appli-
cation of the law to the organization is unconstitutional.
B. Content-Neutral Laws and the Right of Expressive Association
Several landmark Supreme Court cases elaborate on the relation-
ship between content-neutral laws and the right of expressive associa-
tion. In NAACP v Alabama," the Court invalidated a content-neutral
Alabama statute as applied to the NAACP. The Court reasoned that
the statute, which required the release of the names and addresses of
all NAACP members, was unconstitutional because it placed a sub-
stantial burden on the group's freedom of association." Since Ala-
bama's application of the law to the NAACP would expose members
to "economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility" in the racially troubled
South, the law fundamentally interfered with the group's ability to ex-
press its views and conduct its business.6 The Court recognized in
that the First Amendment protected a fundamental right and, thus, could be incorporated against
the states.
11 Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347,360 (1976).
12 See Wisconsin v Mitchell, 508 US 476, 484 (1993) (noting that while an assault carries
with it communicative impact, "a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination [the
type of] expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment").
13 See Metromedia, Inc v City of San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981) (invalidating on free speech
grounds a law forbidding all outdoor advertising display signs and suggesting that a hypothetical
content-neutral and generally applied law would also have been unconstitutional). See also
American Booksellers Association v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323,328 (7th Cir 1985) (holding unconstitu-
tional as "thought control" an ordinance that bans speech that "subordinates" women while
permitting speech that "portrays women in positions of equality").
14 357 US 449 (1958).
15 Id at 467.
16 Idat462.
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NAACP, as it has elsewhere, that in certain situations, generally appli-
cable laws could not be constitutionally enforced.'7
After NAACP, the extent to which an expressive association
could be sheltered from generally applicable laws under the First
Amendment was unclear. In Roberts v United States Jaycees'8 and
other cases,'9 the Court attempted to clarify its reach. In Roberts, the
state of Minnesota sued a men's organization under a sex discrimina-
tion statute because it prevented women from becoming regular
members.'° The Court first analyzed the group's claim under the First
Amendment and then asked whether the state had a compelling in-
terest in overriding the organization's expressive association right. Al-
though the Jaycees had a right of expressive association, a unanimous
Court held that state law overrode this right. On balance, requiring the
Jaycees to admit women as permanent members had only a minimal
effect on its expression, and the state had a compelling interest in end-
ing gender discrimination.' The decision to force the Jaycees to com-
ply with state law qualified the right of freedom of association, yet the
Court simultaneously construed that right broadly. With the possible
exception of commercial entities,22 the Court suggested that most ex-
17 See California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 568 (2000) (invalidating a Califor-
nia statute creating the so-called "blanket primary," despite its general application); Gremillion v
NAACP, 366 US 293 (1961). See also Green v Connally, 330 F Supp 1150, 1179 (D DC 1971)
(holding that the Internal Revenue Code "does not provide a tax exemption for, and ... does not
provide a deduction for a contribution to, any organization that is operated for educational pur-
poses unless the school or other educational institution involved has a racially nondiscriminatory
policy as to students"), affd, Coit v Green, 404 US 997 (1971) (affirming without opinion).
18 468 US 609 (1984).
19 See, for example, New York State Club Association v City of New York, 487 US 1 (1988);
Board of Directors of Rotary International v Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537 (1987).
20 See Minn Stat § 363.03(3) (1982). See also Roberts, 468 US at 613:
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of membership, including individual or
regular members, associate individual members, and local chapters. Regular membership is
limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while associate membership is avail-
able to individuals or groups ineligible for regular membership, principally women and
older men. An associate member, whose dues are somewhat lower than those charged regu-
lar members, may not vote, hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership
training and awards programs.
21 See Roberts, 468 US at 628 ("[E]ven if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental
abridgement of the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to ac-
complish the State's legitimate purposes.").
22 Id at 634 (O'Connor concurring) ("[Tihere is only minimal constitutional protection of
the freedom of commercial association."). Justice O'Connor would distinguish between groups
that engage in expressive, as compared with commercial, association, and extend First Amend-
ment protection to only the former. Thus, in Roberts, Justice O'Connor determined that the Jay-
cees was a commercial organization and on that ground found no infringement on its right of ex-
pressive association. Id. The number of justices accepting this argument is uncertain; although no
one joined Justice O'Connor in Roberts, in New York State Club Association Justice Kennedy
joined Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion noting this distinction. See New York State Club
Association, 487 US at 19-20.
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pressive organizations are guaranteed a certain level of First Amend-
ment protection.3
II. BOY SCOUTS OFAMERICA V DALE: EXPANDING THE
CONCEPTION OF CONTENT-NEUTRAL LAWS THAT
INFRINGE ON EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
With NAACP and Roberts as precedent, the Supreme Court nev-
ertheless delivered an expansive First Amendment holding in Dale.
Part II.A briefly reviews the essential facts of Dale and outlines the
Court's expressive association test. This analysis will later prove valu-
able in determining whether the reasoning in Dale can be extended to
a private university's claim of an expressive association right to pursue
diversity. Part II.B then considers some other Supreme Court prece-
dent that could bear on such a claim.
A. Review of the Facts and the Emergence of a Concrete
Expressive Association Test
James Dale, a member of the Boy Scouts since the age of eight,
applied for adult membership upon turning eighteen. 2 Dale's adult
membership was initially approved, but was soon terminated. His ter-
mination letter explained that "the standards for leadership estab-
lished by the Boy Scouts of America ... specifically forbid member-
ship to homosexuals." 5 Dale received the letter a few weeks after be-
ing interviewed by a local newspaper for an article in which he affili-
ated himself with the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance and
discussed the need for gay role models.6
In Dale, the Court applied a two-step test to determine whether
an organization will receive First Amendment protection for expres-
sive association. First, one must determine whether the organization in
question participates in expressive association.27 Second, one must de-
cide whether the inclusion of an individual "significantly burden[s]" an
23 See Roberts, 468 US at 622:
[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the
First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety
of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends In view of the various
protected activities in which the Jaycees engages, that right is plainly implicated in this case.
(internal citations omitted).
24 Dale, 530 US at 644. Individuals over the age of eighteen who wish to hold leadership
positions within the Boy Scouts must apply for adult membership. Dale applied for adult mem-
bership and was given a position as an Assistant Scoutmaster in Troop 73. See id. See also Boy
Scouts of America-National Council, available online at http://www.scouting.org/nav/
enter.jsp?s=ba (visited June 22, 2004) (explaining how adults may join the Boy Scouts).
25 Dale, 530 US at 665 (internal citation omitted).
26 Idat645.
27 Idat648.
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organization's ability to advance the ideas it intends to promote.8 In
analyzing these questions, one evaluates (i) whether the group ad-
heres to the ideology in question, (ii) whether evidence in the record
supports this claim, and (iii) whether the inclusion of a particular per-
son within the group would materially impair the organization's abil-
ity to express its message. Additionally, when analyzing these steps,
one should "give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression [as well as] give deference to an association's
view of what would impair its expression."29
The Court's assessment of the Boy Scouts' claim illustrates the
extent of this test. First, in analyzing whether the Boy Scouts was an
expressive association, the Court turned to the Boy Scouts' mission
statement. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that
the general goal of the Boy Scouts was clear: "to instill values in young
people."3 Such a commitment, Rehnquist wrote, unquestionably signi-
fied that the Boy Scouts "engage[d] in expressive activity."3 As the
Boy Scouts is a nonprofit group, this case did not raise the concerns
that Justice O'Connor expressed in Roberts regarding for-profit or
commercial organizations. 2
Having found the Boy Scouts to be an expressive organization,
the Court addressed the question of whether reinstating Dale would
unconstitutionally burden the organization. As illustrated above, the
Court first needed to determine whether the Boy Scouts took an ideo-
logical stand against homosexuality. The Boy Scouts argued that the
Scout Oath and Law's reference to the requirement that all Scouts be
"morally straight" and "clean" represents its position opposing homo-
sexuality.3 Although it recognized the ambiguity of these terms, the
Court nevertheless deferred to the Boy Scouts' interpretation of its
standards. As one possible interpretation of "morally straight" and
"clean" was at odds with a gay lifestyle, the majority reasoned that this
was sufficient to establish that the Boy Scouts opposed homosexuality.
Additionally, when the Boy Scouts was asked to clarify its position on
openly gay Scout leaders, it pointed to a 1978 statement in which it
had declared that it did not "believe homosexuality and leadership in
Scouting are appropriate..'' . Thus, Rehnquist concluded that the or-
28 Idat653.
29 IL
30 Id at 649.
31 Id at650.
32 See note 22.
33 Dale, 530 US at 650.
34 Id at 652. But see id at 667-71 (Stevens dissenting) ("[i1t is plain as the light of day that
neither one of these principles-'morally straight' and 'clean'-says the slightest thing about
homosexuality.").
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ganization was sincere in its opposition to homosexuality.3 Rehnquist
emphasized, however, that such an inquiry was not necessary; evi-
dence in favor of the Scouts would merely be "instructive" in deter-
mining the validity of the Boy Scouts' claim.6
Rehnquist at last moved to the central issue of the case: whether
the inclusion of Dale in the Scouts would materially impair the Boy
Scouts' ability to promote its ideology. After initially noting that the
First Amendment could not be used to "erect a shield" exempting an
organization from a conflicting state statute,37 the majority concluded
that, if the Boy Scouts reinstated an openly gay advocate of gay rights,
it would "force the organization to send a message, both to the youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual con-
duct as a legitimate form of behavior."'" The majority thought the Boy
Scouts' predicament was analogous to the concerns raised by the
plaintiffs in Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston. In Hurley, a unanimous Court held that the appli-
cation of a state law to the organizers of a private St. Patrick's Day pa-
rade, requiring them to allow a gay rights group to march in their pa-
rade with a group banner, violated the plaintiffs' free association
rights by altering the expressive content of the parade." The organiz-
ers of the parade could not be legally forced to "propound" the mes-
sage of the group in their parade. The plaintiffs in Hurley did not de-
sire to keep out gays per se, but wished to exclude the particular ex-
pression (gay rights) that the group wanted to promote with its ban-
ner. The Boy Scouts terminated Dale's membership because he openly
advocated his sexuality and, as a Scout leader, his presence would
send the message that the Boy Scouts accepts such behavior.
Rehnquist made three additional points in clarifying what claims
could garner expressive association protection. First, he stated that or-
ganizations do not have to associate for the "purpose" of propagating
a specific message-the message with which the state regulation inter-
feres-to get First Amendment protection.' In other words, the Boy
Scouts did not have to be organized around an anti-gay principle, as
the New Jersey Supreme Court had implied. 2 The mere fact that an
35 Idat653.
36 Idat651.
37 Idat653.
38 Id.
39 515 US 557 (1995). See Dale, 530 US at 659 n 4 ("We anticipated this result in Hurley
when we illustrated the reasons for our holding in that case by likening the parade to a private
membership organization.").
40 Hurley, 515 US at 566.
41 Dale, 530 US at 655.
42 See Dale v Boy Scouts of America, 160 NJ 562, 734 A2d 1196,1223 (1999) ("Boy Scout
members do not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is ir-
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organization's expressive activity is impaired, in any regard, is enough
to raise First Amendment concerns.
Second, the First Amendment also protects an organization's
ability to choose its "method of expression." 3 The lower court had
held that, because the Boy Scouts guidebook mandates that Scout
leaders refrain from addressing sexual topics, the fact that Dale was
openly gay would not affect his ability to continue to instill the values
that the Boy Scouts sought to advance." For Rehnquist, however, the
fact that the Boy Scouts specifically discouraged Scout leaders from
discussing sexual topics was immaterial."5 Although a conflict between
Dale's sexual orientation and his leadership position might not arise,
the Boy Scouts had a right to ensure, on its own terms, that its beliefs
were not diluted."
Third, Rehnquist established that "the First Amendment simply
does not require that every member of a group agree on every issue
for the group's policy to be 'expressive association."' 7 Furthermore,
Rehnquist continued, the First Amendment does not require that an
organization "trumpet its views from the housetops." Rehnquist thus
made clear that disagreement within an expressive group over aspects
of its ideology, and the absence of a loud and unequivocal statement
of this ideology, would not impede a group from asserting that its as-
sociative rights had been unconstitutionally violated.
In sum, the Boy Scouts is an expressive association because it at-
tempts to instill certain values in its members and it outwardly ex-
presses (though perhaps in contradictory ways) these values. Second,
with regard to its ideology, the Boy Scouts had established a position
on homosexuality, a position demonstrated by evidence in the record.
Third, as the New Jersey antidiscrimination law forced the Boy Scouts
to reinstate Dale into a leadership role, and thereby forced the Boy
Scouts to express ideas contrary to its moral ideology, the law unduly
infringed on the Boy Scouts' right of freedom of association.
B. Roberts and Runyon v McCrary as Roadblocks to a Private
University's First Amendment Right to Pursue Diversity
While the language of Dale broadens First Amendment protec-
tions, other cases might narrow these protections. This Part anticipates
this possibility by analyzing a handful of cases, arguably distinguish-
moral."), revd, 530 US 640.
43 Dale, 530 US at 655.
44 Dale, 734 A2d at 1203.
45 Dale, 530 US at 655.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Idat656.
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able from Dale, that make uncertain the extension of the right of free-
dom of association to discriminatory private universities.
1. The compelling interest test as a defense against a private
university's First Amendment right to pursue diversity.
Recall that in Roberts the Supreme Court held that a compelling
state interest, such as sex equality, could trump expressive association
rights if the law only minimally burdened an organization. 9 Thus, the
Court could distinguish Dale and invoke the compelling interest test
of Roberts to justify denying a private university the ability to imple-
ment a race-based affirmative action program.0 This is unlikely for
two reasons. First, the majority in Dale emphasized that Roberts, and
the compelling interest test it discusses, should not be viewed as allow-
ing a state interest to prevail over an association's First Amendment
rights when such rights are materially burdened. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated:
We recognized in cases such as Roberts ... that States have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women
in public accommodations. But in each of these cases we went on
to conclude that the enforcement of these statutes would not ma-
terially interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to
express.
This characterization of Roberts led Rehnquist to conclude that,
having determined that the Boy Scouts was seriously burdened by
Dale's reinstatement, a state interest could not overcome this constitu-
tional violation." This is true regardless of the importance of the
state's interest. In short, Dale has shifted the focus in expressive asso-
ciation claims. The Court will now focus primarily on the extent of the
burden placed on an organization by a state law rather than on the le-
gitimacy of the state's interest.3
49 468 US at 626.
50 This Comment does not take a position on whether a state interest in preventing dis-
crimination against homosexuals is more or less important than a state interest in ending racial
discrimination. Hurley and Dale have subsequently undermined the importance of determining
the compelling nature of a state's interest since it is relevant only if associational rights are
minimally affected.
51 Dale, 530 US at 657.
52 Id at 659. Rehnquist stated:
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy Scouts retain Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the organization's right to oppose or disfa-
vor homosexual conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommoda-
tions law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of ex-
pressive association.
53 In Roberts, the Court's central point was that provided a state demonstrates a compel-
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Second, in analyzing a case in which the state sought to prohibit
discriminatory affirmative action policies, the state's compelling inter-
est in promoting a colorblind society would be countered by a simi-
larly compelling interest in promoting diversity as recognized in Grut-
ter v Bollinger." In other words, in Roberts, the question raised was
whether a state's interest in ending discrimination could trump an or-
ganization's belief in maintaining discriminatory policies; however, in
the affirmative action context, the state interest in creating colorblind
admissions is matched by a similarly compelling interest in creating a
diverse student body.
The case that embodies the Court's current position on expres-
sive associational rights is Hurley. Rehnquist noted Hurley's impor-
tance in Dale: "Although we did not explicitly deem the parade in
Hurley an expressive association, the analysis we applied there is simi-
lar to the analysis we apply here. We have [ ] concluded that [the]
state['s] requirement . . . would significantly burden the [Boy
Scouts]."5 Indeed, according to Rehnquist, the Court's decision in
Hurley anticipated, and was specifically tailored to resolve, a case such
as Dale.16 As a result, the compelling interest test will be relevant only
if the state regulation minimally intrudes on associational rights.
Such a question is wholly distinct from whether the interests of the
state prove more important, on balance, than the autonomy of an
organization.
2. Does Runyon v McCrary forbid discriminatory admission
standards by private universities?
In Runyon v McCrary,7 the Supreme Court held that a private
school violated a federal civil rights statutem when it denied admission
to African-American children. One argument the school advanced
was that forcing it to admit African-American students violated its
First Amendment associational rights.9 As a result, many scholars read
Runyon as a clear rejection of a private university's ability to deny
ling state interest it can trump First Amendment rights: "We are persuaded that Minnesota's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination ... justifies the impact that application of the
statute to the Jaycees may have on [its] associational freedoms." Roberts, 468 US at 623. Under
Rehnquist's characterization in Dale, however, the Roberts Court would not have had any reason
to emphasize the state's interest provided the regulation substantially burdened the organization.
54 539 US 306 (2003) (recognizing that diversity is a compelling state interest and uphold-
ing a state university's affirmative action admissions policy).
55 Dale, 530 US at 659.
56 Id.
57 427 US 160 (1976).
58 42 USC § 1981 (2000).
59 Runyon, 427 US at 175-76.
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admission based on race under the First Amendment.Y By this line of
thought, the only reading of Dale that is reconcilable with Runyon is
that discrimination based on race is sufficiently dissimilar to the Boy
Scouts' anti-gay position. However, a closer reading of Runyon indi-
cates that the Court went out of its way to emphasize that it was not
ruling on the First Amendment claim. The majority stated:
It is worth noting at the outset some of the questions these cases
do not present. They do not present any question of the right of a
private social organization to limit its membership on racial or
any other grounds. They do not present any question of the right
of a private school to limit its student body to boys, to girls, or to
adherents of a particular religious faith, since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is
in no way addressed to such categories of selectivity... Rather,
these cases present only two basic questions: whether § 1981 pro-
hibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from
denying admission to prospective students because they are Ne-
groes, and, if so, whether that federal law is constitutional as so
applied."
In other words, the issue of whether a private institution can
claim a freedom of expressive association right to use discriminatory
admission procedures has not been addressed. Additionally, the Court,
although referring to Norwood v Harrison' as supportive of an argu-
ment that "[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as
a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment," clarified that this type of discrimination had yet to be
granted clear constitutional protections.i Thus, whether a First
Amendment claim exists regarding private discrimination is, at best,
unsettled. Finally, in relation to the issue of this Comment, because the
private schools in Runyon were commercial, for-profit institutions, a
claim of freedom of expressive association of nonprofit institutions
was not addressed.
In short, although Roberts and Runyon arguably impose limits on
the ability of private educational institutions to employ discriminatory
policies, they are only minimally relevant to whether the Court's ex-
pansive understanding of the freedom of association in Dale can be ap-
plied to private universities advancing affirmative action programs.
60 David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities' Racial
Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 619,626 (2001) ("Many scholars read
Runyon as rejecting a well-developed expressive association claim.").
61 Runyon, 427 US at 167-68.
62 413 US 455 (1973) (holding that state aid to racially discriminatory private schools is
constitutionally infirm).
63 Runyon, 427 US at 176, citing Norwood, 413 US at 470.
64 A troubling implication of recognizing a First Amendment right to pursue diversity is
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III. THE SCOPE OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AFTER DALE:
A PRIVATE UNIVERSITY'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO PURSUE DIVERSITY
In recent decades most colleges and universities have sought to
counter racial prejudice by creating diverse student bodies through af-
firmative action programs. In the public education context, the Su-
preme Court addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams under the Fourteenth Amendment in the recent cases of Grutter
v Bollinger65 and Gratz v Bollinger.6 While the specific decisions in
these cases are limited to public institutions by the Fourteenth
Amendment's state action requirement, in practice the federal gov-
ernment's ability to withhold federal school grants forces both public
and private universities to comply with the Court's demands.67 With-
holding of federal funds-funds accepted by nearly all academic insti-
tutions -seemingly makes academic the determination of whether
private universities can discriminate under Dale because universities
that it seemingly also allows an educational institution to promote discrimination against minori-
ties. For example, if a school believes that students perform better in racially or ethnically ho-
mogenous environments, this too could be protected. However, discrimination against minority
or ethnic groups may be unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment. In Jones v Alfred H.
Mayer Co, 392 US 409 (1968), the Court considered whether 42 USC § 1982 prohibits private
discrimination on the basis of race and, if so, whether the statute is constitutional. The Court held
that § 1982 bars private as well as public racial discrimination. Thus, if a private educational insti-
tution discriminated against a historically oppressed group in a manner that bears "the badges
and the incidents of slavery," the Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit such action. Id at 440.
65 539 US 306 (2003) (holding that a public university could use race as one factor in its
admissions policy in order to promote diversity).
66 539 US 244 (2003) (holding that a public university could not give certain races a pre-
determined number of admission points in an effort to create a diverse student body).
67 The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State shall ... deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," thus limiting its application to actions by the states.
US Const Amend XIV, § 1. Some have suggested that because of the large government contribu-
tions received by almost all private universities, in addition to previous Supreme Court decisions
creating a broad state action doctrine, see, for example, Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 US 715 (1961) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the actions of a restaurant located in
a publicly constructed and operated parking garage), discussion of whether "private" universities
can discriminate in pursuit of diversity against a state regulation barring affirmative action pro-
grams is meaningless. If private universities were deemed state actors, they would need to abide
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Several cases, however, under-
mine this argument. Most notable is Rendell-Baker v Kohn, 457 US 830 (1982). In that case, peti-
tioners were employees of the New Perspectives School, a privately owned institution specializ-
ing in "problem" students, which was heavily regulated by public authorities and obtained be-
tween 90 and 99 percent of its operating budget from public funds. Id at 831-32. The Supreme
Court stated that the lower court "concluded that the fact that virtually all of the school's income
was derived from government funding was the strongest factor to support a claim of state action
... [but] we conclude that the school's receipt of public funds does not make the discharge deci-
sions acts of the State." Id at 840. More importantly, the Court stated that while "the school ... is
not fundamentally different from many private corporations,... [a]cts of such private contractors
do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in
performing public contracts." Id at 841.
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will be financially compelled to comply. Yet the impact of Dale on a
private university's ability to implement affirmative action programs is
not simply an academic exercise. The broad definition of expressive
association adopted in Dale arguably inhibits both federal and state
governments from applying burdensome restrictions to private aca-
demic organizations.8 This Part analyzes whether the application of a
state statutory restriction to a private university's decision to use af-
firmative action in selecting students violates the university's First
Amendment right to expressive association as defined by the Supreme
Court in Dale.
A. Do Private Universities Satisfy Dale's Test for First Amendment
Protection?
1. Are private universities expressive associations?
In Dale, the Court noted that, to be considered an expressive as-
sociation, "a group must engage in some form of expression, whether
it be public or private."" The Court took particular note of the Boy
Scouts' mission statement, which spoke of "instilling values" and pre-
paring Scouts to make ethical choices, in ruling that the Boy Scouts
had engaged in the requisite amount of expressive activity.0 Moreover,
the Court noted that such clearly expressive conduct is not required;
rather, training in certain skills such as "outdoor survival skills," or
participation in community service, might be sufficient.71 The Boy
Scouts' mission statement is strikingly similar to those commonly used
by colleges and universities.7 First, like the Boy Scouts' mission state-
ment, school mission statements indicate a school's core values; a de-
sire to increase diversity is often among these.7 Second, when schools
68 For example, a private institution could raise a First Amendment claim, in line with
Dale, if the federal government attempted to withhold funding because a particular educational
institution employed discriminatory admissions policies in pursuit of diversity. But see Bob Jones
University v United States, 461 US 574 (1982) (holding that a private university's religious rights
under the First Amendment do not prevent the government from denying tax-exempt status to
such universities if they racially discriminate on account of the state's compelling state interest in
ending racial discrimination). Arguably, the reasoning of Dale and Hurley weakens the preceden-
tial value of Bob Jones.
69 530 US at 648.
70 Id at 649.
71 Id at 650 (citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence).
72 For example, the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy stated as its
goal to "achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus
make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts." Grutter, 539 US at 315. See also
Grinnell College's mission statement, online at http://www.grinnell.edu/offices/president/
missionstatement (visited June 22, 2004) ("The College exists to provide a lively academic com-
munity of students and teachers of high scholarly qualifications from diverse social and cultural
circumstances.").
73 See Charlotte Hawkins Johnson, Keeping the Door Open: The Fight to Keep Race-
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do not provide explicit mission statements, some nevertheless factor
race into their admission decisions." Such factoring is analogous to the
Boy Scouts' illustrating a commitment to instill values in Scouts
through "outdoor activities." Third, the Court seemingly recognized
educational institutions as expressive associations in Dale when it
noted that "activities protected by the First Amendment [include] a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends."7 While the Court may have used "educational" to indi-
cate that the teaching of particular ideas-rather than education in
general-merits protection, this is nonetheless farther evidence that
the Court will construe most universities as "expressive associations."
Still, whether private universities are expressive associations is
unclear. First, it is debatable whether all or even some universities
promote any ideology. Perhaps more accurately, schools merely create
76
a forum for the expression of ideas and values to take place. Indeed,
it may be precisely contrary to a university's express purpose to ad-
vance certain values, since universities often pride themselves on
open-mindedness and tolerance. In short, the argument goes, univer-,
sity students and faculty do not usually congregate to outwardly pro-
mote ideas such as diversity or to "instill values"; they associate to dis-
cuss ideas and, as a result, are not expressive associations under the
First Amendment.
This objection is flawed for two reasons. First, it misunderstands a
university's position on diversity. Universities promote diversity not
simply to create a forum of ideas or to encourage a diversity of views,
but because they believe that diversity will benefit students by un-
dermining stereotypes. A university, similar to the Boy Scouts, pursues
diversity to instill core values in its members. Diversity is good, in
other words, not simply because it allows for the propagation of
ideas;" rather it is important who is promoting different ideas and how
these actions undermine social ills. Second, the fact that a university
may organize for the express purpose of providing a forum for ideas -
rather than to advance specific ideas-does not undermine its First
Conscious Admissions in Higher Education, Natl Bar Assn Mag 20 (July-Aug 2001) (stating that
after Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), most schools have in-
corporated diversity into their mission statements).
74 Further evidence of this contention is demonstrated by the amicus curiae brief filed in
Grutter by eight universities, indicating their use of race as a means to promote diversity. See
Brief of Harvard University, et al, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v Bollinger,
No 02-241 (US S Ct filed Feb 18,2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 399220).
75 530 US at 647, quoting Roberts, 468 US at 622 (emphasis added).
76 This forum, of course, is not to be confused with a "public forum," a term of art in First
Amendment law.
77 If propagation was the sole concern, universities might be content assigning reading es-
pousing these views or promoting them in other ways.
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Amendment claim. The majority in Dale, in fact, refuted this type of
argument when it stated that "[t]he First Amendment's protection of
expressive association is not reserved [solely] for advocacy groups
.... [T]o come within its ambit, a group must [merely] engage in someS ,,78
form of expression. Thus, even if a school does not advocate specific
values, as the above critique maintains, the fact that it provides for de-
bate and encourages open-minded thought amounts to engaging in
expressive activity.79
Moreover, a university may through its activities demonstrate ex-
pressive activity. The promotion of open-mindedness and the ex-
change of ideas, themselves, instill and encourage values. Dale does
not so much require an organization to advocate specific ideas to be
recognized as an expressive association as it requires that ideas and
values be encouraged. Indeed, the First Amendment's principal pur-
pose is to promote a "marketplace of ideas," a function for which
schools are particularly well suited. As Justice O'Connor noted in
Grutter, "We have long recognized that, given the important purpose
of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
78 530 US at 649.
79 This second contention is potentially less convincing in light of Rosenberger v University
of Virginia, 515 US 819 (1995), and Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533 (2001). In
Rosenberger, the Court held that when the government does not itself speak and the primary
purpose of the program receiving benefits is to "encourage a diversity of viewpoints," denying
subsidies to a particular group is unconstitutional. 515 US at 834. Similarly, in Velazquez, the
Court held that Congress could not limit the types of cases attorneys could argue in order to re-
ceive federal funding. The Court reasoned that
although the LSC [Legal Services Corporation] differs from the program at issue in Rosen-
berger in that its purpose is not to "encourage a diversity of views," the salient point is that,
like the program in Rosenberger, the LSC program was designed to facilitate private
speech, not to provide a governmental message .... [Ain LSC-funded attorney speaks on
the behalf of the client in a claim against the government .... The lawyer is not the gov-
ernment's speaker.
531 US at 542. Notably this applies only when private speakers are speaking on their own behalf
and not on behalf of the government. See Rosenberger, 515 US at 833 ("When the government
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legiti-
mate and appropriate steps to ensure that the message is neither garbled nor distorted by the
grantee."). In short, the common thread to finding an unconstitutional condition on a govern-
mental denial of a subsidy relates to whether the governmental program in question is designed
to facilitate private speech. This is in contrast to situations where the government is refusing to
fund programs because the government, as speaker, refuses to support an institution promoting a
specific message. See Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 186 (1991) (holding that government may
regulate content of a message (by withholding funds) when it is the speaker). See also Boy
Scouts of America v Wyman, 335 F3d 80 (2d Cir 2003) (holding that the state did not violate the
Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights by terminating its participation in a state workplace chari-
table campaign due to its discriminatory membership policy). Because a private university is ad-
vancing its own private message, however, and not that of the government, there is a colorable
argument that a government regulation cannot impose a restriction on funding the viewpoint di-
versity created by affirmative action programs.
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thought associated with the university environment, universities oc-
cupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."'
In short, the above criticism deviates from a fair reading of Dale.1
A more faithful reading of Dale suggests that private universities do
engage in the requisite amount of expressive activity. Universities
provide a forum for students to encounter ideas, and universities ar-
guably promote the advancement of ideas generally. Most importantly,
as noted earlier, Dale simply requires that a group "engage in some
form of expression. "' Thus, it is not even necessary for an organization
to promote a specific view, such as diversity; all that is required
is that schools participate in the expressive activities protected and
encouraged by the First Amendment. As universities clearly provide,
at minimum, a forum for the pursuit of ideas, they satisfy these
requirements.
2. Does a private university's policy promoting diversity
constitute an "expressive ideology"?
The first question under the second part of the Dale test is
whether a pro-diversity admissions policy amounts to an expressive
ideology. At first glance, a school's policy choice in admitting a diverse
student body is as much an ideology as the Boy Scouts' anti-gay posi-
tion. Schools and universities, through affirmative action policies, take
an affirmative and ideological stance on the benefits of diversity-
80 539 US at 329. The passage notably qualifies this position by using the word "public."
This is not a refutation of my argument, however, since I argue only that the principle used in
Dale, if consistent, should be applied to private universities.
81 Another objection against finding private universities to be expressive associations in-
volves drawing a distinction between private universities as "expressive associations" and private
universities as "primarily" expressive associations. This objection arises from Justice O'Connor's
belief that some groups, mainly commercial organizations, should not be granted First Amend-
ment expressive association protection. See Roberts, 468 US at 634 (O'Connor concurring). The
task of determining whether an organization is "primarily" expressive, as she noted in Roberts, is
not always clear. Id at 635 ("Many associations cannot readily be described as purely expressive
or purely commercial."). According to Justice O'Connor, an organization is not primarily expres-
sive "when, and only when, the association's activities are not predominately of the type pro-
tected by the First Amendment." Id. In testing private universities against this standard, one
could argue that due to the financial benefits that arise for private universities in forming their
student bodies, universities do not "primarily" engage in noncommercial expressive activity. This
objection has several flaws. First, and most importantly, this criticism conflates financial activities
(about which every organization must worry) with commercial activities. While universities do
engage in monetary activity, all such activity is intended to enhance the overall experience of
students. Second, because universities promote ideas beyond those that are commercially moti-
vated-answering the main concern expressed in Roberts-universities are "primarily" expres-
sive. A school's emphasis on diversity is a good example-it directly relates to a school's ability
to educate properly. Institutions believe that, by undermining preconceived stereotypes, diversity
provides an ideal learning environment.
82 Dale, 530 US at 649 (emphasis added).
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they argue that diversity undermines racial stereotypes and creates a
better educational environment.'
At least three arguments against treating diversity as an ideology
can be advanced. First, one could argue that a university's belief in di-
versity is wholly distinct from the express ideology protected in Dale.
While the Boy Scouts maintains an anti-gay ideology-a discrimina-
tory position that expresses an idea central to the organization-
schools do not believe that the discrimination in which they are engag-
ing is intrinsically a good thing; it is simply a means to an end. Indeed,
support for affirmative action, unlike discrimination against minori-
ties, is not based on antipathy toward a group, but rather on the belief
that a diverse student body enhances the educational experience of all
students. In other words, because diversity is not integral to the mes-
sage of a university, the First Amendment protections afforded in Dale
should not be extended.
While plausible, this argument-that the centrality of the Boy
Scouts' discriminatory position makes it distinct from the discrimina-
tion effectuated in pursuit of diversity-fails under the language of
Dale. To rephrase the critique, one could argue that there is a critical
difference between a private organization expressing a discriminatory
view (for example, "our members are straight") and a university ex-
pressing a view on diversity ("look at our diverse student body"). In
the former, the organization is advancing a discriminatory view that
is critical to its existence, whereas in the latter, a university is
simply promoting a belief with discriminatory repercussions. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in fact, notes this concern in Dale: "This is not to
say that an expressive association can erect a shield against antidis-
crimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a mem-
ber from a particular group would impair its message."a'
Despite Rehnquist's recognition of this critique, the majority in
Dale thought this distinction to be insignificant. For Rehnquist, Hurley
answered the objection: "the purpose of the St. Patrick's Day parade
in Hurley was not to espouse any views about sexual orientation [that
is, an explicitly discriminatory message], but we held that the parade
organizers had a right to exclude certain participants nonetheless."'
More specifically, in Hurley the Court held:
The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish
sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified social accep-
tance of gays and lesbians or have some other reason for wishing
83 See, for example, Grutter, 539 US at 315 (noting the University of Michigan's argument
that diversity "enrich[es] everyone's education").
84 530 Us at 654.
85 Idat655.
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to keep [the group's] message out of the parade. But whatever
the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to pro-
pound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to
lie beyond the government's power to control."
This reasoning can also be applied to private universities pursuing
diversity. While the race-sensitive discrimination employed by univer-
sities may simply be a means to an end (since universities do not fun-
damentally believe in discrimination), the university's choice in ad-
vancing its message of diversity lies "beyond the government's power
to control."'
Supposing affirmative action programs or mission statements
could be seen as advocating an ideology, an additional argument
against extending First Amendment protection to universities is that
by promoting diversity a university may, in fact, undermine its ability
to demonstrate a uniform principle. Because many private schools are
large, and their students, staff, and faculty have various views, schools
necessarily cannot express the coherence of belief in diversity re-
quired to constitute an expressive ideology.8 According to one scholar,
"[T]he diversity of a large private institution might mitigate against
recognizing an expressive association defense for a preference ration-
alized on diversity grounds; the argument would be that the institu-
tion's very diversity precludes the kind of coherent, self-defining point
of view that the expressive association defense is meant to protect. '
In short, this argument suggests that a private university cannot con-
tend that it has an expressed, unified ideology on diversity because,
ironically, its diverse constituency cannot speak in the coherent collec-
tive voice required of an expressive association.
The language of Dale again refutes this counterargument. The va-
riety of viewpoints on homosexuality existing within the Boy Scouts
did not prevent the group from receiving First Amendment protec-
tion. The Court made clear that all members within an organization
did not have to agree on the organization's stated beliefs. ° While stu-
dents and faculty may disagree on a university's diversity position, the
First Amendment will nevertheless protect an organization no matter
how universally accepted the ideology is within the association.
86 Hurley, 515 US at 574-75.
87 Id.
88 See Peter Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L & Policy Rev
1, 89 (2002).
89 Id.
90 The Court stated: "[Tihe First Amendment simply does not require that every member
of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be 'expressive association."'
Dale, 530 US at 655. This statement is in direct conflict with Professor Schuck's argument.
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A final potential argument against extending Dale to private uni-
versities states that a university's pursuit of diversity cannot amount to
an expressive ideology because it conflicts with the university's mes-
sage of merit. In other words, by granting certain students extra points
based on criteria other than the expressed belief in rewarding aca-
demic excellence, schools maintain contradictory ideologies.9 Yet, the
fact that certain ideological beliefs seem contradictory within an or-
ganization was deemed by the Court in Dale to be tolerable. The Boy
Scouts looked to admit a representative variety of boys and to reach
"all eligible youth"' and still maintained an anti-gay position; this con-
tradiction did not extinguish the organization's First Amendment
rights. Analogously, private universities can set up systems with con-
flicting ideals, such as merit and diversity. In Grutter, the Court specifi-
cally found that the pursuits of an elite law school and of diversity
were not contradictory goals: "narrow tailoring does not require ... a
university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence
or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to all
racial groups."93 Most importantly, it is not the role of the Court to de-
termine which more closely resembles the association's ideology. As
the Court noted in Dale, "[I]t is not the role of the courts to reject a
group's expressed values because they disagree with those values or
find them internally inconsistent."9' If a university believes that these
two goals can be reconciled, that is its choice.
In sum, although the above arguments against an expressive ide-
ology in diversity are reasonable, the Court in Dale indicated that such
arguments would not undermine the ability of an organization to
claim First Amendment protection.
3. Does regulation of a private university's affirmative action
program hinder its ability to promote its ideology?
The final inquiry toward establishing First Amendment protec-
tion for private universities asks whether the regulation in question
hinders the ability of an organization to promote its ideology. This, in
fact, was the central question present in Dale. In defending itself un-
der this final inquiry, a university can argue that state action that for-
bids affirmative action as a means toward creating a diverse class of
students places a substantial burden on the ability of a university to
express its belief in diversity. In other words, forbidding a university to
91 Justice Scalia made this point (in the form of a question) at oral arguments in Grutter.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Grutter v Bollinger, No 02-241, *30-31 (Apr 1, 2003) (available on
Westlaw at 2003 WL 1728613).
92 Dale, 530 US at 650.
93 539 US at 309.
94 530 US at 651.
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consider race in making decisions that advance one of its core beliefs
(the benefits of diversity) unquestionably hinders a school's First
Amendment right to convincingly implement this message.
Several arguments exist suggesting that a regulation forbidding
discriminatory admission procedures does not substantially hinder a
university's ability to promote its belief in diversity. First, it is not clear
that a small number of minority students will dilute or silence the abil-
ity of a school to promote a belief in diversity. In other words, state
regulation of private universities is permissible because universities
can still express a belief in diversity without employing discriminatory
methods to ensure that diversity occurs. This objection, though sensi-
ble, again fails to adhere to the language of Dale. The Court stated:
"The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in a
scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctively different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as
disagreeing with [the Boy Scouts' anti-homosexual] policy."95 A uni-
versity with a large number of diverse students "sends a distinctively
different message" than a university that promotes diversity but does
not employ the necessary tactics to achieve it.
Second, while the lack of affirmative action programs may hinder
a school's ability to create diversity, it does not entirely preclude a
school from promoting diversity. Schools can continue to try to appeal
to minority applicants without giving them preferential treatment.
Schools can heavily recruit minority applicants or simply lower their
standards. The Court, however, addressed and rejected this exact ar-
gument in Dale. The Court was not persuaded by the argument that
because the Boy Scouts did not allow leaders to discuss sexual mat-
ters, the fact that Dale was openly gay would not cause a conflict be-
tween the Boy Scouts' anti-gay belief and Dale's presence." Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court reasoned that the First Amendment is clear: it
does not allow the judiciary to decide what methods an association
should use in disseminating its message. If the Boy Scouts wants to
teach "by example," the First Amendment protects that choice, regard-
less of whether, in actuality, a conflict occurs.9 Similarly, the methods
private universities employ are left to them. Such deference in the
educational context was seen in Grutter, when Justice O'Connor
noted that "It]he Law School's educational judgment that ... diversity
is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer as it
keeps with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a univer-
95 Id at 655-56.
96 Idat655.
97 Id (noting that "the First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts' method of expression"
and that if the Boy Scouts wanted leaders to "teach only by example, this fact does not negate
the sincerity of its belief").
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sity's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed grounds."'
In other words, even assuming that schools could still promote diver-
sity without employing race-sensitive measures, or that diversity could
still occur without these measures, forbidding universities to consider
race as a factor in admissions necessarily interferes with an organiza-
tion's ability to choose which students to admit.
Third, while a regulation forbidding affirmative action policies
might interfere with the ability of a university to promote its belief in
diversity, perhaps First Amendment protection should nevertheless be
denied. In other words, similar to the concerns expressed in NAACP,
the argument is that the First Amendment should apply only when a
regulation materially infringes on the central purpose of an organiza-
tion, undermining the association's ability to function. Since diversity
is not the central reason why educational institutions are founded, and
since regulation of affirmative action programs would not undermine
the purpose or existence of schools, the right of expressive association
should not be granted.
Considering the third argument -that, because a university's cen-
tral purpose is not to advance diversity, state interference is permissi-
ble-the Court emphasized that such an argument did not weaken an
expressive association claim. The Dale Court emphatically rejected the
assertion that the First Amendment will only protect organizations
whose central purpose is infringed; organizations do not have to asso-
ciate for the "purpose" of propagating a specific message in order to
get First Amendment shelter." The Boy Scouts did not have to be or-
ganized around an anti-gay principle, nor do schools have to be organ-
ized around diversity; rather, the mere fact that an organization's ex-
pressive activity is impaired is enough to require First Amendment
protection.
In sum, the language of Dale indicates a doctrinal criterion that
most private universities could meet. Accordingly, in responding to the
central question presented in this Comment-whether the application
of a statutory or regulatory restriction on a private university's deci-
sion to use affirmative action in admission violates the university's
First Amendment right to expressive association as defined by the Su-
preme Court in Dale-I suggest that the answer is yes.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the reasoning in Boy Scouts of America v Dale amounts
to an ad hoc justification allowing the Boy Scouts to discriminate
against gays. In fact, taking Dale at face value may jeopardize a host of
98 539 Us at 328.
99 See Dale, 530 US at 655.
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civil rights legislation, legislation that America depends upon and now
takes as established. The implications of the broad First Amendment
rights granted in Dale make such questions reasonable and important.
This Comment explores just one question: whether Dale can be ex-
tended to private universities arguably employing discriminatory prac-
tices in pursuit of diversity. It concludes that a fair reading of the ma-
jority position in Dale suggests that private universities should be af-
forded this protection.
